The Politics of Anti-Corruption Endeavors

The Politics of Anti-Corruption Endeavors

After the initial participatory diagnosis, the government might sponsor further workshops at several levels (including government officials, international businesses, local businesses, and aid donors). Studies may also play a catalytic role. Of particular interest are studies of systems of data and evaluation (their extent, quality, how used and misused), analysis of actual and hypothetical incentive systems, and studies that contrast successful and unsuccessful cases inside the country involved.

For example, in a given country certain public enterprises can be a significant supply of corruption in international business transactions. Yet other public enterprises may be functioning well and relatively cleanly. Why? What lessons could be learned from your successes?

Studying successes features a psychological benefit. Locals observe that they’re not considered inept by over-generalizing outsiders. Transparency includes a new meaning, by investing in straight answers they could study the other person.

Other studies might attempt to gauge the existence and a higher level of corruption in public procurement, foreign aid projects, and debt repayment (to name three possible locations for corruption in international business transactions). The studies would examine a selected case of the alleged corrupt transaction, but would simultaneously analyze the typical class of cases ones that’s an instance. The methodology would involve interviews on a confidential in the public and private sectors. In other words, we’re not referring to a dry academic study, but the research that evokes from local people their understanding of how corrupt local systems work and what may be completed to make those systems function better.

Such studies would carry an indirect benefit. They would create certain uneasiness one of the locals as common troubles are uncovered and documented. They would also make a baseline of knowledge that future progress can be judged.

It can be a curiosity: political scientists who study administrative change often apparently overlook politics. An effective strategy for fighting corruption should not. Part of the “assessment” of the enabling environment also need to pinpoint the political forces that may aid or block various changes.

“Politics” has another dimension: relations within the country leadership. Ideally, local leaders will already be convinced with the must undertake institutional adjustment. If not, their incentives and constraints have to be carefully analyzed.    The proposed means of administrative adjustment ideally can be transparent. It will be “incentive compatible” even for political leaders with lower than ideal motivations.